We i n troduce a method for characterizing the expressive p o wer of concept expressions in rst-order description logics. The method is essentially model-theoretic in nature in that it gives preservation results uniquely identifying a wide range of description logics as fragments of rst-order logic. The languages studied in the paper all belong to the well-known F L , and AL hierarchies.
Introduction
Description logics have been proposed in knowledge representation to specify systems in which structured knowledge can be expressed and reasoned with in a principled way. They provide a logical basis to the well-known traditions of frame-based systems, semantic networks and KL-ONE-like languages, object-oriented representations, semantic data models, and type systems. Generally speaking, description logics have three main ingredients:
1. a language for de ning concept expressions, 2. means to specify knowledge about concepts and individuals, and 3. methods for reasoning about the knowledge being represented. In this paper we are only concerned with the rst aspects, i.e., with languages for de ning concept expressions. In the design of such languages two important theoretical considerations are complexity and expressive power. A popular slogan here is`complexity versus expressiveness': the more expressive a description logic is, the higher the complexity of the reasoning tasks that can be performed in it. The complexity of satis ability and subsumption problems for description logics has been studied extensively cf. DLNS96, DLNN97 , but the problem of expressiveness of concept expressions has hardly been addressed so far; we are aware of only three publications on this topic Baa97, Bor96, CPL98 . The purpose of this paper is to help ll this gap. We characterize and compare the expressive power concept expressions de nable in all logics in two well-known hierarchies of description logics.
The methods we use rst identify the concept expressions de nable in description logics as fragment of rst-order logic, and then characterize these fragments in terms of a unique model-theoretic property. The main technical tool used is preservation under a suitable notion of bi-simulation.
More precisely, with each description logic L we associate a characteristic bi-simulation such that all and only the L-concepts are preserved under this bi-simulation. Then, the expressive power of concept expressions of two description logics can becompared by comparing the model-theoretic behavior of their concepts with respect to their respective bi-simulations. The characteristic bi-simulations can then be used to classify the concepts that are de nable in description logics.
We think that our results are signi cant for the knowledge representation community because, for the rst time, they give exact and explicit modeltheoretic characterizations of the expressive power of concept expressions de nable in a wide range of description logics. In addition, they illustrate a general method for coping with expressiveness issues; we hope they may b e for understanding knowledge based systems, especially with respect to the descriptive desiderata one may h a ve.
Baader Baa97 seems to have been the rst to propose a formal denition of the expressive power of description logics; the only other formal papers on the issue are Bor96, CPL98 . Our de nition of expressive p o wer is somewhat simpler than Baader's, as we are only concerned with the expressive power of concept descriptions. Implicitly, Bor96 considers the same notion of expressive p o wer as we do. The authors of CPL98 explore notions of expressive p o wer that are appropriate for hybrid languages that combine description logics with rule-based query languages.
Our paper di ers from Baa97, Bor96, CPL98 in that we give exact and explicit model-theoretic characterizations of the expressive p o wer of concept expressions de nable in a wide range of logics cf. Section 5 for further discussion. The results in this paper are based on preservation theorems that are similar to ones found in the literature on modal and temporal logic and the modal -calculus Ben85 , JW96, KR97b . However, as description logics often lack some boolean operations, the proofs of our preservation theorems require novel technical tools and methods. Our preservation results are similar in spirit to the characterizations of nite variable fragments in terms of pebble games due to IK87 . Furthermore, there is a considerable bodyofwork on the expressive p o wer of query languages, but most of this is phrased in terms of complexity classes AHV95, Imm86 . The results in the present paper, however, are entirely model-theoretic.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we describe the technical prerequisites for the paper, and review our notation. Section 3 then explains our method and the de nition of expressive power used. The main results of the paper are contained in Section 4, together with illustrations of their use. Section 6 contains concluding remarks and describes ongoing work. Formal proofs of the main characterization results are included in two appendices.
Technical Background
The main ingredients of description logics are concepts and roles. The former are interpreted as subsets of a given domain, and the latter as binary relations on the domain. Table 1 lists constructors that allow one to build complex concepts and roles from atomic concept names and role names. Description logics di er in the constructions they admit. By combining constructors taken from Table 1 , two well-known hierarchies of description logics may be obtained. The logics we consider here are extensions of F L , ; this is the logic with , ?, universal quanti cation, conjunction and unquali ed existential quanti cation 9R: . 1 AL extends F L , by negation of concept names that is, negations of the form :A, where A is an atomic concept name. Extensions of F L , and AL are denoted by post xing the name of the constructors being added. For instance, F L E U , is F L , with full existential quanti cation and disjunction.
Description logics are interpreted on interpretations I = I ; I , where I is a non-empty domain, and I is an interpretation function assigning subsets of I to concept names and binary relations over I to role names; complex concepts and roles are interpreted using the recipes speci ed in Table 1 . The semantic value of an expression E in an interpretation I is simply the set E I . Two expressions are called equivalent if they have the same semantic value in every interpretation.
For further details on both applications and theoretical aspects of description logics, we refer the reader to DLNS96 , or to the description logic home page at http: dl.kr.org dl .
De ning Expressive Power
In this section we de ne our notion of expressive power, and explain our method for determining the expressive p o wer of a given description logic.
Our aim in this paper is to determine the expressive power of concept expressions of every extension of F L , and AL that can be de ned using the constructors in Table 1 The method we use for explaining the expressive power of description logics has the following ingredients:
1. a mapping taking concept expressions in description logics to fragments of rst-order logic; 2. characterizations of these fragments by model-theoretic means; and 3. comparisons between the expressive p o wer of the concepts de nable in description logics based on comparisons between the corresponding rst-order fragments; cf. Figure 1 , where the rectangle denotes rstorder logic, and the closed curves denote fragments corresponding to concepts de nable in description logics. In line with our methodology we will pursue the above items 1, 2, and 3 for each of the description logics considered in this paper. First, item 1 is next to trivial. The semantics given in Table 1 
:C x = :C x 8R:C x = 8y R xy ! C y ; where y is a fresh variable 9R:C x = 9y R xy^C y ; where y is a fresh variable n R x = 9y 1 : : : y n Observe that to translate concepts and roles in description logics without number restrictions we only need two individual variables.
To be able to state that concepts and roles are equivalent to their translations under and , w e need to relate the semantics of description logics and rst-order logic. But interpretations can naturally be viewed as models for the rst-order language we consider here. Thus, we will for example write I j = x d to denote that the rst-order formula is true in I viewed as a rst-order model, with d assigned to 's free variable x. Below we will exploit this connection, often without making it explicit.
Proposition 3.1 Let C be a concept and R a role. For any interpretation I and any d, e 2 I we have the following equivalences:
1. d 2 C I i I j = C x d 2. d; e 2 R I i I j = R xy de .
Given this proposition we are allowed to simply identify concepts de nable in description logics with their corresponding rst-order fragments, and if no confusion is possible we write C instead of C , and R instead of R .
Proposition 3.1 settles item 1 of our method. Next comes item 2 | this is much more work. The semantic characterizations that we are after will be formulated in terms of preservation under a suitable relation between interpretations. To make this strategy more concrete we rst recast a result from modal logic in description logical terms.
Schild Sch91 was the rst to give a precise formulation of the connection between description logics and modal logics. Readers familiar with multimodal logic will immediately recognize the similarity between existential quanti cation 9R:C and the diamond operator hRiC, and between universal quanti cation 8R:C and the box operator R C. Given this connection between description logics and modal logics, results in the one domain become available to the other. In modal logic, the following notion is now being used as an important model-theoretic tool, even at the textbook level, cf. Pop94 . Bisimulations are also used extensively in concurrency theory Mil89 , and to a lesser extent in the area of semistructured data BDHS96 .
What is the relevance of bisimulations for purposes of the present paper? Brie y, bisimulations are relations between interpretations that preserve all ALC-concepts. This is clear for atomic concept names clause 1 in De nition 3.2, and a simple induction shows it to hold for boolean combinations as well. The back-and-forth clauses 2 and 3 guarantee preservation of existential and universal quanti cation, respectively.
The following theorem establishes a kind of converse for this preservation result; it is the starting point for our investigations. can not just use bisimulations, as such logics lack negation or disjunction, and these are automatically preserved under bisimulations; moreover, the proof of Theorem 3.3 uses the presence of the booleans in an essential way.
For logics more expressive than ALC some of their constructors need not be preserved under bisimulations. Therefore we h a ve to develop new notions of bi-simulation; this will be the focus of our attention in Section 4.
Separating Description Logics
This section contains the main results of the paper. For F L , , AL, and all of their extensions that can bede ned using the constructors in Table 1 , we present semantic characterizations analogous to Theorem 3.3. We subsequently use these to separate logics, thus completing items 2 and 3 of the methodology outlined in Section 3, and obtain a complete classi cation of the full F L , and AL-hierarchies.
We proceed as follows. We rst consider the`minimal' logic F L , , c haracterize its concepts semantically, and use the characterization to separate F L , from richer logics. After that, we treat each of the constructors in Table 1 that are not in F L , , and examine which changes are needed to characterize the concepts de nable in the resulting logics. This is followed by a brief section in which we consider combinations of constructors. Our classi cation results are summarized in a diagram at the end of the section. Proofs of the characterization and combination results are given in two appendices. Throughout this section the following abbreviations will prove to be useful; let X, Y be subsets of a given domain.
X R " Y i for all d 2 X there exists e 2 Y such that Rde X R Y i for all e 2 Y there exists d 2 X such that Rde.
In words, X is R " -related to Y if every object in X`sees' an object in Y ; and X is R -related to Y if every object in Y is`seen' by an object in X. As an aside, the two relations R " and R are two particular instances of`lifting' a binary relation on objects to a binary relation on sets of objects. In the setting of program semantics they are known as the Hoare p ower order and the Egli-Milner power order, respectively; cf. Vic89 .
The Base Case: F L ,
Recall that the logic F L , has , ?, universal quanti cation 8R:C, conjunction C u D, and unquali ed existential quanti cation 9R: .
What do we need to develop a notion of bisimulation that can be used to characterize F L , -concepts? First of all, ordinary bisimulations as de ned in De nition 3.2 preserve negations of concepts | this is obviously too much for F L , , as it does not have negations. To destroy preservation of negations we will introduce a direction in the atomic clause of De nition 3.2, and hence make bisimulations non-symmetric. This change will enable us to preserve positive negation-free information only. However, disjunctions would still be preserved under such non-symmetric bisimulations. As F L , does not allow disjunctions of concepts, we need to block this as well. To achieve this, we change the format of bisimulations: instead of linking an object to an object, we will link a set of objects to an object. The notion of preservation will then say that if a concept or formula holds for every object in the set, then it must hold in the`similar' object. If a disjunctive concept or formula holds for all objects in a set of size at least two this no longer implies that one of the disjuncts holds for all objects in the set; as a consequence the inductive argument needed to prove Theorem 3.3 may break down. 2
De nition 4.1 Let I = I ; I and J = J ; J b e t wo i n terpretations. An F L , -simulation is a non-empty relation Z P I J such that the following hold. 
The basic intuition underlying the clauses in De nition 4.1 is that atomic concepts need to be preserved clause 1; we only need to preserve unquali ed existential quanti cations clause 2, but we need to preserve full universal quanti cation 8R:C, where C may itself be a complex concept | this necessitates the`and Y 1 Z e 2 ' in clause 3. Of course, in addition we need to preserve conjunctive concepts C u D, but this we get for free. Theorem 4.2 Characterization of F L , Let x be a rst-order formula. Then x is equivalent to an F L , -concept i it is preserved under F L , -simulations. The intuition underlying the change in clause 1 of De nition 4.4 as compared to clause 1 of De nition 4.1 is that both positive and negative atomic information now needs to be preserved in passing from I to J . Theorem 4.5 Characterization of AL Let x be a rst-order formula. Then x is equivalent to an AL-concept i it is preserved under AL-simulations. Corollary 4.6 Let L be a description logic that can be obtained from AL by adding any non-empty combination of U, C, E, N, o r R. Then AL L. Also, if L is obtained from F L , by adding one of U, E, N, or R, then L 6 AL.
Proof. As in Corollary 4.3, by way of example we only consider one case for the proof of the rst claim. We show that AL is strictly less expressive than ALU by providing an ALU-concept that is not equivalent t o a n y AL-
The ALU-concept A t B is not equivalent to an AL-concept. In the two interpretations I, J depicted above w e h a ve that fd 1 ; e 1 g A t B I , and there exists an AL-simulation linking fd 1 ; d 0 1 g to d 2 , but d 2 = 2 A tB J . By Theorem 4.5, then, A t B can not be equivalent t o a n AL-concept. De nition 4.7 Let I = I ; I and J = J ; J b e t wo i n terpretations. An F L E , -simulation is a non-empty relation Z P I J such that the following hold. 
Proof. As before, we will only prove the corollary for one case. We will show that F L E , is strictly less expressive than F L E N , . The interpretations in the following gure show that the F L E N , -concept 2 R is not equivalent to an F L E , -concept. u u P P P P P P q 1 u u u d1 d2 I J In the above gure we h a ve fd 1 g 2 R I but d 2 = 2 2 R J even though there is an F L E , -simulation indicated by the dotted lines that links fd 1 g to d 2 . a
Adding Disjunction
For F L U , we obtain the appropriate notion of simulation by taking Definition 4.1, but instead of linking sets of objects to objects, we now link objects or: singleton sets to objects. As explained in the introduction to this section, if a notion of simulations links sets of objects to single objects, disjunctions need not preserved, the reason being that from the fact that, if X is a set, then X C t D I does not imply X C I or X D I . Proof. As before, we will only prove the corollary for one case. We will separate F L U , from F L U R , . The interpretations in the following gure show that the F L U R , -concept 9R u S: is not equivalent t o a n F L U , -concept. R S R S u P P P P P P q 1 u u u u d1 d2 
Adding NumberRestrictions
To arrive at a notion of simulation for F L N , we use the above ideas together with ideas from Rijar . The main feature of the notion of F L N , -simulation is that in order to guarantee preservation of numberrestrictions it records the size of sets of objects taking part in the simulation. It does this using a whole sequence of relations between sets of sets of objects on the one hand and sets of objects on the other; later on, in the presence of disjunction we will beable to simplify these to relations between sets of objects on both sides.
The following notation will prove to be useful. We write R d 1 Y 1 if for all e 1 2 Y 1 , Rd 1 e 1 holds. As before, since F L N , is a logic without disjunction, our notion of simulation for F L N , needs to relate sets of objects to objects. But we need a bit more. For, let I beaninterpretation, and let X 1 I be such that X 1 By indexing i-clouds with the set above which they hang, we can ensure that every cloud is above exactly one set only.
We are ready now for the de nition of an F L N , -simulation. We use P ! X to denote the collection of nite subsets of X. De nition 4.14 Let I = I ; I and J = J ; J be two interpretations. An F L N , -simulation between I and J is a sequence of relations 5. if X 1 Z 0 d 2 and X P P ! I is a non-empty i-cloud R-above X 1 To grasp the intuition behind De nition 4.14, observe that Z 0 is the`engine' of the simulation that guarantees preservation, and the other relations other relations Z i , for i 0, are speci ed in the text below.
A P P P P P P i u u u P P P P P P q 
Combinations
The semantic characterization results obtained so far form the basic building blocks for our further results. Brie y, the idea is that one should obtain semantic characterizations of logics that contain combinations of the constructors C, U, E, N and R by combining the characterizations of the logics admitting only one of the constructors. It turns out that there is surprisingly little interaction between the various characterizations, and where there is interaction this results in a simpli cation especially when U is added or in restoring symmetry of various clauses when E or C is added. Only in rare cases such as F L N R , does the characteristic notion of simulation become more complex.
As the details do not add too much to the analysis, we do not include them here, but in Appendix B.
Harvest
We summarize our results in Figure 2 . The way one should read the diagram is as follows. Every logic coincides with one of the logics in the diagram, and if a description logic L 1 is above a logic L 2 via a sequence of one or more arcs, then L 2 L 1 . If two logics are incomparable in the diagram, then they are incomparable with respect to their expressive p o wer. Second, it should be noted that the classi cation obtained in Figure 2 is exactly the classi cation that one would expect from an intuitive point of view where one logic is more expressive than another if it has more constructors. We view this absence of surprises both as an intuitive justi cation of our results, and as an indication that we h a ve provided a mathematical underpinning for the basic intuitions one has concerning the expressive p o wer of description logics.
And nally, we should point out that expressive power as studied here and complexity of the satis ability problem do not induce the same classi cations of description logics: there are description logics that have the same complexity results for their satis ability problems but have di erent expressive power in our sense. To substantiate this claim, let us consider the complexity theoretic classi cation of AL-based description logics that has been obtained in DLNN97 ; see Table 2 . 3 Notice the following:
The satis ability problems for AL and ALN are both decidable in polynomial time, but according to our analysis ALN is strictly more expressive than AL. The satis ability problems for ALE, ALR, and ALER are all NPcomplete, yet ALER is the most expressive of these. The satis ability problems for ALU and ALUN are coNP-complete, but ALUN is strictly more expressive than ALU. The satis ability problems for ALC, ALUR, ALNR, ALCN, ALCR, ALEN, ALENR, ALUNR, and ALCNR are all PSPACE-complete, yet the logic ALCNR is the most expressive of these.
What is the upshot? Description logics whose satis ability problems are complete for the same complexity class need not have the same expressive power in our sense. There are two sides to this. Of course, at equal computational costs one may wish to opt for the most expressive logics. At the same time, the precise relation between these alternative w ays of classifying description logics remains to investigated | we think that this is one of the most challenging issues in the area.
Discussion
We see two major lines of work related to this paper, the rst one centered around the use of model-theoretic methods similar to the ones we h a ve used, the second one focusing on the expressive p o wer of description logics.
As to the rst theme, the technique of Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e games in rstorder logic is closely related to our simulations, and it has been used to obtain numerous separation and preservation results; see Doe96 . IK87 use pebble games to obtain model-theoretic expressivity results about nite variable logics, and related techniques have been used in modal logic as well; for instance, KR97b use various kinds of bisimulations to characterize temporal logics with Since and Until. Also, TN97 use similar methods to separate query languages over temporal databases. One of the principle advantages shared by these methods is their explicit and intuitive descriptions of the languages being studied. The results in this paper are di erent from the above ones, as we are interested in relatively poorlanguages with limited expressive p o wer and without closure under some of the boolean operators; this focus necessitates both new notions of simulations and novel techniques for proving the characterization results.
As to the second theme | expressiveness of description logics |, we know of only three earlier references: Baa97 , Bor96 , and CPL98 . We will brie y discuss each of these. Baader's work is di erent from ours in two important ways. First, Baader's de nition Baa97, De nition 3.2 of expressive power di ers from ours. Recall that we we de ne a logic L 1 to be at least as expressive as a logic L 2 if for every L 2 -concept there is an equivalent L 1 -concept over the same vocabulary. Thus, we focus on de nable concepts over a given vocabulary only, but, at least intuitively, Baader's de nition allows L 1 to use additional concepts and roles in nding L 1 -equivalents for every L 2 -concepts. More formally, let , bea collection of concepts, and let Voc, denote the collection of all atomic concepts and roles occurring in ,. Further Clearly, this more involved de nition allows one to equate more description logics with respect to the concepts they can de ne than ours does; for instance, under Baader's de nition negation of atomic concepts can be simulated by number restrictions over additional roles, whereas according to our results negations of atomic concepts cannot be expressed using numberrestrictions over the same vocabulary. 4 While we agree that it may beuseful to beable to use additional concepts and roles in nding equivalent expressions, as Baader himself points out, what is lacking from his de nition is a measure on how much additional material one may use and on the complexity of the function that maps L 2 -expressions to equivalent L 1 -expressions over a richer vocabulary.
A second important di erence between Baader's work and ours lies in the type of results that have been obtained. Baader only establishes a small number of separation results, whereas we provide a complete classi cation of all languages de nable using the constructors in Table 1 . More importantly, our separation results are based on semantic characterizations; this gives a deeper insight i n to the properties of logics than mere separation results. Let us now turn to Borgida's Bor96 . There, the author shows that certain description logics have the same expressive power as the two or three variable fragment of rst-order logic over the same vocabulary. A few remarks are in order here. First, like us Borgida has a strong focus on denable concepts, and he ignores other aspects of description logics. Next, it is well-known that there is a correspondence between some description logics and modal logics see Sch91 , and modal logicians have considered the links with nite variable fragments for quite some time see Gab81 . Thus, Borgida's results could also have been obtained this way. Finally, the description logics considered in this paper are all expressible in the two v ariable fragment of rst-order logic possibly with counting, however, none coincides with the full two-variable fragment. The third and nal reference on expressive power of description logics that we are aware of is CPL98 . In this paper the authors consider hybrid knowledge bases that consist of a TBox, an ABox, a set of Horn rules, and a relational database. The description logic underlying the TBox and Abox is ALCNR, for which we gave a semantic characterization in the present 4 As an aside, the di erence between our de nition and Baader's is analogous to the di erence between de nability and projective de nability in the area of model-theoretic logics; see BF85 . paper see Section 4.8. The authors of CPL98 focus on capturing the expressive power of their hybrid knowledge bases in terms of collections of nite structures in some complexity class that are de nable by means of queries to such knowledge bases.
How are such complexity theoretic characterizations related to the model theoretic ndings of the present paper? To start, results such a s F agin's Theorem Fag74 provide links between complexity theoretic characterizations of expressive p o wer and linguistic descriptions in terms of sets of logical formulas; this is the level at which the work of CPL98 is situated. Next, these linguistic descriptions may b e c haracterized in terms of special, independent model theoretic properties; and this is the level at which the present paper is located.
Conclusion
In this paper we h a ve i n troduced a model-theoretic method for determining the expressive power of concept expressions de nable in description logics. The method consists of three components: a translation into a common background logic here rst-order logic over a suitable vocabulary, semantic characterizations of the translated logics, and using these characterizations to separate logics. The method was successfully applied to obtain expressiveness results for all logics in the F L , and AL hierarchies.
The main bene ts of our methods are that they give exact and explicit characterizations of the concept expressions that are de nable in the description logics that we consider. our characterizations explain in semantic terms why one logic is or is not di erent from another. While the proofs of the semantic characterizations in terms of various notions of bi-simulation are admittedly somewhat technical, the use of the characterizations in separating logics is fairly intuitive, as we hope to have demonstrated with our examples. As summarized in Figure 2 , our mathematical ndings corroborate the intuitions one has concerning the expressive power of description logics; we view this as additional evidence in support of our methods.
It should be noted that the role of our semantic characterization results is in separating the expressive power of description logics, not in showing that they coincide with respect to the concept expressions that these logics can de ne. For the latter, we use explicit syntactic de nitions of the constructions of one logic in terms of the constructions of the other.
Future research in this area will concentrate on the following themes. 1. As was pointed out above, the proofs for our characterization results use rst-order techniques in an essential way. We aim to avoid these techniques, and thus to extend our methods to description logics with non-rst-order features. A Appendix: Proofs of the Main Results
For each of the logics obtained by adding constructors from Table 1 we will now prove the main semantic characterization theorems announced in Section 4. The proofs all follow the same basic strategy. One half of the result is proved by a simple induction; the other half is more involved and uses compactness arguments, and, in some cases, additional techniques from rst-order logic.
Theorem 4.2 Let x be a rst-order formula. Then x is equivalent to an F L , -concept i it is preserved under F L , -simulations.
Proof. The implication from left to right is proved by induction on concepts.
The atomic case is immediate from the de nition of F L , -simulations, and conjunction is easy. Let us consider the existential case. Assume X 1 Z d 2 .
Suppose that X 1 9R: I . Let Y 1 := fv 2 I j 9w 2 X 1 R I wvg. Now, for the right to left implication, assume that x is preserved under F L , -simulations, and let Con be the set of its F L , -consequences. Claim A.1 Con j = .
If we can prove Claim A.1, then, by compactness, there exists a nite conjunction of elements of Con that is equivalent to x. So let us prove Claim A.1. Assume that I j = Con w . We need to show that I j = w . Let , = f:C j C is in F L , and w = 2 C I g. Claim A.2 For every :C 2 ,, the set f x; :Cg is consistent.
If the claim were false, then C would be a consequence of , contradicting the de nition of ,. As a corollary we nd, for every :C 2 ,, a n i n terpretation I C and element v C 2 I C such that v C 2 x I C :C I C . Let The key result used in the proofs of Theorems 4.2 and 4.5 is the compactness theorem. To prove characterization results for languages that are richer than F L , we need additional semantic tools, over and above the compactness theorem. The proof of our characterization result for F L E , , Theorem 4.8, uses so-called !-saturated models. Brie y, a n i n terpretation I for a rst-order language L is !-saturated if whenever is a set of rst-order formulas in a language L 0 , where L 0 extends L 1 by the addition of nitely many new individual constants, and each nite subset of is satis able in an L 0 -expansion of I, then is satis able in this expansion.
A key result about !-saturated models that will be used in our proofs below says that, in a countable language, every interpretation I has an !-saturated elementary extension I ; that is, for every interpretation I there is an !-saturated interpretation I such that I I and for every rst-order formula x 1 ; : : : ; x n and any objects d 1 , . . . , d n 2 I , I j = d 1 ; : : : ; d n i I j = d 1 ; : : : ; d n . We refer the reader to any textbook on model theory for further details; see e.g., Hod93 .
Theorem 4.8 Let x be a rst-order formula. Then x is equivalent to an F L E , -concept i it is preserved under F L E , -simulations.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.2 we assume that x is preserved under F L E , -simulations, and we concentrate on proving that Con j = , where Con is the set of F L E , -consequences of x. So, we assume that I j = Con w , and we need to show that I j = x w . Let , = f:C j C is in F L E , and w = 2 C I g. As in Claim A.2 one can show that for every :C 2 ,, the set f x; :Cg is consistent. Consequently, for every :C 2 , there are interpretations I C and objects v C such that v C 2 x I C :C I C . Let and X 1 Z d 2 . We need to nd an e 2 2 I with R I d 2 e 2 and Y 1 Z e 2 . Let C 1 u u C n be an arbitrary nite conjunction of concepts such that Y 1 C 1 u u C n J . Clearly, then, X 1 9R:C 1 u u C n J . By the de nition of Z we nd that d 2 2 9R:C 1 u u C n I . This implies that there exists e 2 2 I such that e 2 2 C 1 u u C n I . At this point we use the fact that I is !-saturated. As we h a ve been able to nd an object e 2 in I that satis es R I d 2 e 2 together with an arbitrary nite collection of concepts satis ed by all the objects in Y 1 , b y !-saturation we can in fact nd an object e 2 in I with R I d 2 e 2 that satis es all concepts satis ed by the objects in Y 1 . This means that Y 1 Z e 2 , as required.
With the proof of Claim A.5 completed, we have found an F L E , -simulation between J and I that relates fv C 2 J j :C 2 ,g and w.
Hence we h a ve the situation depicted in the following diagram. A walk around the diagram completes the proof. From fv C 2 J j : C 2 ,g x J and the fact that there is an F L E , -simulation linking fv C 2 J j : C 2 ,g to w in I , it follows that w 2 x I . As I is an elementary extension of I, w e get w 2 x I , and we are done. a
Recall that the change required to prove a characterization result for F L U , is that we no longer work with simulations involving sets, but with ones involving single objects only. for this characterization result we will also need to use !-saturated models.
Theorem 4.11 Let x be a rst-order formula. Then x is equivalent to an F L U , -concept i it is preserved under F L U , -simulations.
Proof. As before, we leave the left to right direction to the reader, and only give a sketch of the right to left direction to the extent that it di ers from previous proofs Theorems 4.2, 4.8. Assume that x is preserved under F L U , -simulations, and consider the set of its consequences in F L U , , Con . As before it su ces to prove that Con j = . So, we assume that I j = Con w , and we need to show that I j = x w . Let , = f:C j C is in F L U , and w = 2 C I g. Claim A.6 The set f xg , is consistent.
If the claim were false, there would beconcepts :C 1 , . . . , :C n 2 , such that j = ::C 1 u u : C n , or, in other words, j = C 1 t t C n . So w 2 C 1 t t C n I as w 2 x I , and hence w 2 C I 2 8R:C I , and therefore X 1 6 8R:C I , and we are done. Now, to prove the harder right to left direction, assume that x is preserved under F L N , -simulations. As in the proofs of our previous preservation results, we proceed to prove that Con j = , where Con is the set of F L N , -consequences of x. So, we assume that I j = Con w , and we need to show that I j = x w . Let , = f:C j C is in F L N , and w = 2 C I g. As in Claim A.2 we nd interpretations I C and objects v C such that v C 2 x I C :C I C , and we form the disjoint union J of the interpretations I C . Clearly, the relation fX d ; d j d 2 X d g is the`Z 0 '-component of an F L N , -simulation linking fv C g in J or I C t o v C in I C or J . As a consequence, we obtain that v C 2 x J n C J .
We leave it to the reader to establish an analog of Claim A. To prove the claim, observe rst that clauses 1 4 of De nition 4.14 are trivially ful lled, so we only have t o c heck clauses 5, 6 and 7. As to clause 5, assume that X 1 Z 0 d 2 , and that X P P ! J is an i-cloud which i s Rabove X 1 2 C J and the induction hypothesis this implies X 1 6 8R:C I , and we're done.
Next, to prove the right to left direction, we assume that x is preserved under F L R , -simulations, and proceed to prove that Con j = , where Con is the set of F L R , -consequences of x. So, we assume that I j = Con w , and we need to show that I j = x w . Let , = f:C j C is in F L R , and w = 2 C I g. As in Claim A.2 we nd interpretations I C and objects v C such that v C 2 x I C :C I C , and we form the disjoint union J of the interpretations I C . We leave it to the reader to check that there is an F L R , -simulation linking fv C g in J or I C to v C in I C or J . It follows that v C 2 x J n C J .
We also leave it to the reader to establish an analog of Claim A. 
B.1 Extensions of AL
As we have seen from the de nitions of bisimulation and AL-simulation
De nitions 3.2 and 4.4, in the presence of negation or negated atomic concept names, the clause guaranteeing preservation of atomic concept names either becomes symmetric in the case of full negation or we have to add preservation of negated atomic concepts as well.
That is, let ALX beone of ALE, ALU, ALN, or ALR. To obtain a characteristic notion of simulation for ALX, w e simply take the characteristic notion of simulation for F L X , and add to the clause for preservation of atomic concept names the clause that negations of atomic concepts should also be preserved as in De nition 4.4. Then, the relevant preservation theorems may be proved.
B.2 Extensions of F L E ,
With full quali ed existential quanti cation 9R:C present in the logic, the back-and-forth conditions that record the presence of roles, have to become symmetric: not only does the relational pattern need to be matched, but it needs to be matched with a similar object. For the semantic characterization results for the logics F L E U , , F L E N , , and F L E R , , this requires the following.
F L E U , -simulations are de ned just like F L U , -simulations De nition 4.10 except for clause 2, which needs to be 2 0 . For every atomic role name R, i f R I d 1 
B.6 Classifying an Arbitrary Description Logic
To obtain a characterization of an arbitrary description logic de ned from As a concrete example, consider L = ALENR. As AL L, the atomic clause in the notion of an L-simulation needs to preserve both atomic concepts and their negations. On top of that we need to ensure preservation of E as explained in Section B.2, and of N and R as explained in Section B.4. Putting things together, we get that the notion of simulation needed to characterize ALENR, is a tuple Z 0 , Z 1 , . . . ; Z r 1 , Z r 2 , where Z 0 , Z 1 , : : : i s a n ALEN-simulation which is just like F L E N , -simulations, except for the atomic clause, and where Z 0 ; Z r 1 ; Z r 2 i s a n ALER , -simulation which is just like F L E N , -simulations, except for the atomic clause.
